How Brazil Expanded the World Coffee Economy by Topik, Steven
11OeZG 30 | 2019 | 3
Steven Topik
How Brazil Expanded the World Coffee 
Economy
Abstract: Coffee’s growth in Brazil since 1727 is an excellent case study of the 
adaption of an external coffee frontier to an internal one. The expansive in-
ternal frontier started in the 18th and 19th centuries using an exotic plant, with 
Brazilian coffee farmers eventually adapting and advancing new cultivars and 
technologies to create an intensive frontier in domestic areas, some of which 
were formerly unfamiliar to coffee. Brazil’s success revolutionized worldwide 
demand for coffee and eventually spread the crop throughout most of the 
tropics. It was in good part due to the Brazilian experience that coffee became 
one of the world’s most valuable internationally traded agricultural commod-
ities.
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Introduction
Coffee’s growth in Brazil is an excellent case study of the expansion of an external 
coffee frontier – which began in Yemen – to an internal one that emerged later in 
Brazil. An expansive internal frontier started in the Portuguese colony in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries using an exotic plant, and over time Brazilian cof-
fee farmers adapted and advanced new cultivars as well as the technologies of the 
first and second industrial revolutions to create an intensive frontier in domestic 
areas formerly unfamiliar to coffee. Brazil’s success revolutionized the world mar-
ket demand for coffee and eventually spread the crop throughout most of the trop-
ics. It was in good part due to the Brazilian experience that coffee became one of the 
world’s most valuable internationally traded agricultural commodities.
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Brazil has dominated the world coffee economy for so long that many people 
assume coffee is indigenous to the region, but in fact it is not. Agronomists and bota-
nists agree that Coffea arabica originated naturally in and around Ethiopia hundreds, 
if not thousands of years ago. There, humans harvested and ate wild coffee cherries. 
Coffee trees and bushes were first domesticated across the Red Sea in Yemen in the 
fifteenth or sixteenth century; they were subsequently transported to Indian Ocean 
areas such as India, Java, and Ceylon, where they became a colonial crop. Brazil only 
received coffee in 1727, at least three hundred years after humans began drinking it.
In Yemen, coffee seedlings were planted in gardens alongside subsistence crops or 
on terraced hillsides. Almost everywhere else, coffee was a frontier crop, with farm-
ers cutting down tropical forests to replace them at first with coffee seeds. In Brazil, 
cafeicultura experienced extensive frontiers through replacement of the indigenous 
tropical Atlantic Forest with arabica seeds and seedlings as well as intensification of 
the frontier with the introduction of new Coffea cultivars. The scale evolved from 
garden cultivation to larger fields, then to huge plantations cultivated using slave 
labor before returning to smaller landholdings worked by immigrant colonos and 
ultimately, in the twentieth century, shifting to freeholders of various sizes. Coffee 
agriculture developed from gardening to predatory slash-and-burn techniques tak-
ing advantage of “forest rent” and, towards the end of the nineteenth century, grad-
ually adopted new industrial technologies. After the 1950s, farmers began applying 
the techniques of the “green revolution” by using chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and 
tractors. This article will concentrate on the era before the 1950s with a brief update 
at the end.
Brazil fundamentally reshaped the world coffee economy and the nature of its 
commodity chains beginning in the nineteenth century. Not only did Brazilians 
largely satisfy the growing world demand, they also stimulated and transformed the 
place of coffee on overseas tables. The dependency-focused view of agricultural pro-
ducers as servants or providers of brute manpower, willingly serving up their pro-
duce to thirsty European buyers who were the masters of the trade, misrepresents 
the nature of the relationship. Brazilians – be they natives or immigrants of African, 
Portuguese, or Italian origin – developed new production techniques, discovered 
productive cultivars, established an elaborate domestic transportation network in a 
geographically unpromising setting, and developed market standards and financial 
instruments as well. They were able to out produce all the European colonial grow-
ers during the coffee boom in the Age of Imperialism and continue to dominate the 
global market even today. I will discuss why Brazil was a comparative latecomer to 
coffee cultivation, how outside forces caused it to spread into virgin parts of the col-
ony to become the world’s leading producer, the effects of slavery and the Brazilian 
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transition to free labor, and finally the consequences of Brazilian actions on global 
coffee commodity chains.
Why Brazil?
Early research on coffee in Brazil attributed its success to nature and to luck: The 
subcontinent offered a suitable semi-tropical climate, substantial rainfall, fertile soil 
for Coffea arabica to thrive, and it was colonized by the Portuguese. The Portuguese 
explorers and traders who colonized Brazil had a history of moving cultivars across 
national and continental frontiers and then producing them for export. They had 
transplanted sugar from the Mediterranean to West Africa and Brazil, peanuts from 
the Americas to Africa and Europe, mangos and sweet potatoes from India to Africa 
and eventually to South America, and cacao as well as manioc from Brazil to West 
Africa. They were also major traders of enslaved Africans. In short, Brazil’s climate 
and Portuguese heritage seemed to have preordained it to be the world’s leading cof-
fee cultivator.
Yet the story was not so simple. With their history of transplanting important 
agricultural crops across four continents, one might assume it was the Portuguese 
who brought coffee to Brazil. After all, they were the first Western Europeans to 
explore the birthplace of coffee in Ethiopia as early as 1490, and they did so again in 
1520–1526 when a fleet was sent to assist the Abyssinians. As allies of the Christian 
Abyssinians, Portuguese troops and Jesuit missionaries came to protect the Ethio-
pian Christians against Muslim jihadists. In the 30 years (1603–1633) that the Jesuits 
were the Ethiopian king’s preferred religion, they built churches – including some in 
the province of Kaffa, where coffee is thought to have originated.1 The Jesuits’ most 
successful missionary in Ethiopia, Pedro Paéz Jaramillo, is said to have tasted coffee 
in Mocha before arriving in Ethiopia. But despite being at the right place at the right 
time for pioneering coffee cultivation, none of the Portuguese missionaries to leave 
reports mention the plant or drink. Nor is there evidence of anyone drinking coffee 
in Ethiopia before the eighteenth century, much less cultivating it.2
The paradox becomes even more pronounced when we consider that the Por-
tuguese were the first Europeans to introduce the other major stimulant – Chinese 
tea – into Europe, and that it was the Portuguese princess Catherine Braganza, the 
wife of Charles II, who helped turn the English into tea drinkers. It is therefore clear 
that the Portuguese at least thought about drinking the new fruits and leaves they 
encountered. Nonetheless, the first coffee to arrive in Brazil came much later – and 
it was introduced via the French, not the Portuguese.
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Dutch and French mercantile companies brought coffee from the Indian Ocean 
to the Guianas and from there to Brazil a full two hundred years after a thriving 
Middle Eastern coffee economy based on Yemeni production had developed. These 
Western European powers pushed the coffee frontier westward because their sub-
jects were slowly developing a taste for the beverage’s psychoactive and medici-
nal properties through trade performed with the Middle East. The only exporting 
area, Yemen, could not meet the growing European demand, and as a result Dutch, 
British, and French merchant capitalists created East India companies and began 
encouraging locals in India, Java, and Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) to grow coffee. Euro-
pean settlers coerced native peoples and later enslaved Africans to cultivate coffee in 
the Americas. Though increasingly spread out geographically, worldwide coffee pro-
duction in 1700 was still very small.
Brazilians were relative latecomers despite having the requisite natural resources, 
climate, location, and colonial heritage, and the fact that they were early modern 
pioneers in transatlantic commodity trade as well as biological adventurers cannot 
explain the present-day country’s coffee dominance. In fact, after arabica seedlings 
arrived in northern Brazil via French Guiana in 1727, it took almost 80 years before 
the colony began exporting meaningful amounts – even though contemporaneous 
French and Dutch planters expanded overseas shipments much more quickly in the 
Circum-Caribbean. The Americas exported 80 percent of the world’s coffee in 1800, 
but almost all of it was grown in the Circum-Caribbean, while Brazil at this point 
was exporting almost none.
Brazilian coffee exports lagged behind in the eighteenth century despite rapidly 
increasing European demand because the Portuguese colony was also the world’s 
principal sugar grower and a significant tobacco supplier at the time. Since the inter-
national markets for sugar and tobacco grew earlier and were larger than the Euro-
pean demand for coffee, Brazilian growers initially concentrated on those better 
developed and more profitable markets rather than on coffee. Clearly, a commodi-
ty’s global expansion depended not only on the appropriate setting, labor, demand, 
and transport. Its pace and location were also conditioned by the size of the world 
market, by competing crops within the respective colony or country, and by compet-
itors abroad. For most of the eighteenth century, Brazilian coffee cultivation would 
remain overshadowed by sugar.
In fact, despite the emphasis of development and dependency theories on export 
production to explain the course of economic growth, coffee was not initially an 
export commodity in Brazil. For the first century of its cultivation in the area, it was 
grown along with other subsistence staples like maize, manioc, beans, and fruits as 
well as small quantities of crops that were mostly consumed at home, like tobacco, 
sugar, cotton, and indigo.3
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Coffee only arrived in Rio de Janeiro, one of the two largest consumption 
entrepôts in Brazil, in the 1760s – two and a half centuries after Portuguese mari-
ners first stepped onto Brazil’s shores and three decades after Coffea seedlings were 
first planted in the northern soils. The Portuguese had arrived in a land of mostly 
self-sufficient indigenous peoples who were as much hunters and fishermen as they 
were agriculturalists, and who relied on barter rather than commodity exchange. 
When the native people did export to European markets, their products were har-
vested using predatory techniques rather than agricultural ones and shipped out by 
Portuguese and French merchants. Brazilwood, a dyewood cut in the forests, was the 
most important export.
This changed when sugar (an imported cultivar) and tobacco (indigenous to 
Brazil) began to be grown for export in the second half of the sixteenth century and 
gold and diamonds were mined in the eighteenth century.4 But coffee would have 
to wait until the nineteenth century to be exported, and even the domestic market 
remained small after arabica seedlings arrived in Rio in the mid-1700s. They had 
been brought to Pará from French Guyana in 1727 by Francisco de Melo Palheta, a 
Brazilian soldier and diplomat.5 Palheta transported roughly a thousand coffee seeds 
and five seedlings; he planted some on his own land and passed some on to the Pará 
municipal council, which was composed of rich and influential locals. Government 
officials distributed coffee plants in Maranhão and Ceará, sharing them with plant-
ers or other favorites.6 In 1731, only four years after de Palheta brought the first cof-
fee plants to Brazil, the governor of Maranhão wrote that “in the farms surround-
ing this city and even in estates there will be much good coffee […] in two or three 
years because the trees yield so much fruit. We will be sending excellent coffee to 
Portugal […] by the arroba [a measure of 15 kilos].”7 While he was correct in that 
the first Brazilian coffee reached the Portuguese metropolis of Lisbon the next year, 
it was only a paltry quantity of seven pounds. In 1749, there were around 17,000 cof-
fee plants in Brazil supplying 4,835 arrobas (over 70,000 pounds) to Lisbon.8 We do 
not have much information on these early coffee growers since research has largely 
focused on the export sector. It is safe to say, however, that their holdings were small, 
with multiple crops and few, if any, slaves working the fields.9
In Rio, the arabica was initially disseminated not by a mercantile company, as 
had been the case in earlier coffee exporting regions like Java, Reunion, and Suri-
nam, nor by planters but instead by Portuguese officials and religious orders. Prom-
inent among these were the Capuchins and the bishop of Rio de Janeiro. It would 
take decades before coffee exports became important, however. The report issued 
by Viceroy Lavradio in 1779 neglected to mention coffee altogether.10 According to 
Joseph Banks, the famous naturalist who accompanied Captain Cook to Rio in 1768, 
coffee was still being imported from Portugal (probably originating from Yemen).11 
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By 1778, the Englishman John White reported that the coffee that had formerly 
come from Portugal “now grows so abundantly that it permits a considerable expor-
tation,” although he lamented that there were no coffeehouses in Rio.12 It was only 
when Western Europeans slowly began developing a taste for coffee that settler cul-
tivators thought of sending it abroad. French and Dutch immigrants brought seeds 
and seedlings during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that had originally 
been procured in the Indian Ocean. They planted them in small orchards alongside 
other experimental crops such as ginger and pepper.13 The arabica beans were pri-
marily for the limited local consumption; some colonial officials and traders hoped 
that they could be exported, though tea was much preferred to coffee in Portugal at 
the time. 
What coffee did do in Brazil – unlike in any other Portuguese colony – was to 
drive the Europeanized and African populations into the colony’s interior while 
dislodging and eventually exterminating most of the native peoples. Coffee was a 
frontier crop that depended as much on destruction as on construction. Growers 
adopted the indigenous slash-and-burn method of clearing forest lands to replace 
them with cultivated plants until the soil wore out; they then moved on to clear new 
forest areas, creating what has become known as a “hollow frontier”.14 Only in the 
final three decades of the nineteenth century did production begin to integrate some 
of the technologies of the second industrial revolution.
Although the amounts grown during the colonial period before 1822 were still 
small, coffee had clearly been diffused throughout much of the country before Prince-
Regent Dom João VI and some 19,000 members of the royal court arrived in 1808. 
Coffee beans and seedlings were probably brought to the interior of Brazil by traders 
and small-scale farmers. John Mawe, an English mineralogist who traveled through 
inner Brazil between 1807 and 1810, was served coffee in the southern province of 
Santa Catarina as well as in the southeastern provinces of Minas Gerais and Rio de 
Janeiro. And the morning meals Mawe enjoyed were already called café da manhã 
(morning coffee), even though breakfast was known in Portugal as pequeno almoço, 
meaning small lunch or dinner. It seems that coffee had already become something 
of a national custom in the late colonial era. Coffea could be grown in almost every 
region of Brazil, but internal transport was still primitive and slow, so the hospitality 
drink served to Mawe and other visitors must have been grown at home or locally. It 
was invisible to trade statistics.15 When describing the local food and drink, foreign 
travelers visiting Rio de Janeiro during the colonial period did not mention coffee – 
which at the time was grown locally by Europeans in gardens – before the 1780s.16 
There was no discussion of coffee houses until the nineteenth century.17 It was only 
production for export to Western Europe and later the U.S. after Brazil’s independ-
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ence that would eventually vastly increase the scale of cultivation and revolutionize 
the coffee commodity chain.
The Impact of Outside Forces
Coffee’s intensified expansion in Brazil and its increasing export orientation were 
largely brought on by external events, in particular by the consequences of the 
French Revolution. Napoleon Bonaparte’s forces invaded Portugal in 1807, forcing 
Prince-Regent Dom João VI to order the largest trans-oceanic migration of an impe-
rial capital in history assisted by his English allies. With the Portuguese ports of Lis-
bon and Porto occupied by the French-Spanish allies, the prince-regent’s first act 
upon reaching Brazil was to open its ports to non-Portuguese (and non-French) 
ships. British ship captains and merchants, blocked from their European continen-
tal markets by the French troops and navy, became particularly interested in the Bra-
zil trade. At the same time, the aristocrats and Portuguese merchants newly arrived 
in Brazil who had been stripped of their traditional sources of income and custom-
ary purchases turned to local products. However, Dom João had tea – not coffee – 
planted by two hundred Chinese farmers imported from Macau in the Royal Botan-
ical Garden he ordered built outside the urban center of Rio de Janeiro.18 But despite 
this royal preference, coffee would prove more successful. The state’s direct role in 
stimulating the coffee economy was limited; it left entrepreneurship to the private 
sector until the twentieth century.
With the arrival of the prince-regent (who became king in 1816) and the instru-
ments of Portuguese imperial governance under the protection of the British fleet, 
Brazil’s place in the world economy was transformed. It went from being a colony 
to becoming an official co-kingdom in 1815. It should be emphasized that Brazil’s 
sudden leap to global dominance in the coffee trade was not owed exclusively to the 
availability of the factors of production or the maneuvers of merchants and bank-
ers. International politics served to force rapid change as well: Rather than con-
tinue its existence as a colonial appendage whose role was to supply surpluses to Lis-
bon through mercantilist unequal trade, Brazil became by law what it had de facto 
already been for decades: the center of the Portuguese Empire and, in 1822, a sov-
ereign nation.
In 1810, two years after the Portuguese mercantilist system had been disbanded, 
the monarch signed a commercial treaty with England. British naval ships and trad-
ers were especially favored by this development, since they no longer had to deal 
with traders in Lisbon or Porto but instead could become masters of Brazilian com-
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merce and involved in the Brazil-West Africa trade. Indeed, to repay British aid and 
insure commercial growth, British merchants were given a preferential tariff, and 
the pound sterling became the unofficial currency of trade in the Brazilian ports.19 
The City of London became the banking headquarters for the Brazilian crown.20 
Brazilians were also successful in the nineteenth century thanks to British neo-colo-
nialism in the form of inexpensive and reliable shipping and insurance, loans, infra-
structure investments, and protection of sea routes.21 Thus while the British did not 
export or import much coffee from their own colonies at this time, they exported 
and re-exported large quantities from Brazil, which they considered a neo-colony. 
Most of these exports went to the two other fastest-industrializing areas in the world: 
the United States and the lands that became Germany.
The French Revolution not only spurred Napoleon’s continental blockade, it 
also upended the global coffee market by inspiring freedmen and slaves in Saint-
Domingue (today: Haiti) to revolt in 1791. By the time Haiti declared its independ-
ence and abolished slavery in 1804, its fields had been destroyed and its place as the 
world’s greatest coffee exporter was lost. With European demand continuing to grow 
despite the drop in Haiti’s exports, prices rose to dizzying heights. This captured 
the attention of Brazilian fazendeiros (planters), who increasingly transitioned from 
sugar to coffee in the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais.
Their decision was of momentous importance for the social life of coffee. Falling 
prices and increasing availability transformed the drink from a limited indulgence 
of the urban elite to an ever more popular mass beverage in the nineteenth century.22 
Brazil was not only responding to European and incipient North American demand, 
but in fact was itself a motor of the growing desire for coffee in the most dynamic 
and affluent centers of the world economy. It is certainly conceivable that if Brazilian 
planters and their African and Afro-Brazilian workers had not been able to create 
an unprecedented revolutionary boom in production, coffee might not have become 
so ubiquitously popular. The coffee-drinking habit and the associated commodity 
chain were not yet well established in Europe, and in England and the Middle East, 
coffee drinkers were later converted to tea drinkers. Other hot drinks like chocolate 
or even mate therefore might easily have taken the place of coffee instead. Chance 
and timing played key roles in the Brazilian success story.
Yet history proved that once coffee was grown for export, Brazilians were able 
to continue expanding their coffee cultivation at an unprecedented rate. The esti-
mate for the largest export volume from Yemen during the first quarter of the eight-
eenth century, when the country still had a virtual monopoly on international cof-
fee trade, was between 12,000 and 15,000 metric tons; by 1789, total world exports 
had more than quadrupled to around 60,000 metric tons.23 But the real explosion of 
trade volumes was yet to come: It was only when Brazil began exporting in signifi-
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cant amounts during the early nineteenth century that world production truly sky-
rocketed. By 1856–60, it had multiplied fivefold, reaching 325,000 metric tons; by 
the turn of the twentieth century, it had tripled again to around 1,000,000 metric 
tons. This vast expansion of production was centered in Brazil, which was respon-
sible for almost half of the world coffee exports in 1850 and three-quarters in the 
period from 1901 to 1905.24 Indeed, Brazil’s exports jumped 75-fold between 1822, 
the year of its independence as a country, and 1899 as worldwide consumption grew 
more than 15-fold in the nineteenth century.25 Most of the growth of the global cof-
fee economy in the 1800s was due to Brazilian farmers and workers.
This meteoric rise in Brazil’s coffee output occurred despite earlier British 
endeavors to end the Atlantic slave trade by demanding that eventual abolition be 
included in the 1826 and 1831 trade treaties with Brazil, and despite the efforts of 
Dom João’s most important advisor, José Bonifácio, to expedite the abolishment of 
slavery.26 The lure of profit convinced Brazilians and Portuguese to continue ship-
ping human cargo – often surreptitiously – from Africa. This was evidenced by a 
sudden spurt in African slave imports; as many enslaved people were transported 
across the Atlantic between 1807, when the British Parliament outlawed the slave 
trade, and 1850, when it effectively ceased, as in the previous hundred years when 
sugar plantations and gold mines had demanded unfree African workers.27 Most of 
the new arrivals in the post-independence era wound up being involved in some 
aspect of coffee production.
With the exception of Cuba and Puerto Rico, no other major coffee-growing 
area was able to import Africans during the nineteenth century when the coffee 
trade took off. Brazilian fazendeiros benefitted greatly from the spurt of captive Afri-
cans, since their free domestic population was reluctant to labor in the cafezais (cof-
fee fields) under the harsh conditions slavers imposed. With enormous expanses of 
fertile land and the armed campaigns by farmers to drive the indigenous popula-
tion ever further into the interior, poor free people cultivated their own subsistence 
plots rather than working for stern taskmasters. More prosperous men received land 
grants from the crown, purchased terrain from other owners, or simply occupied it 
and bought mostly imported people to work it.
The first profitable private coffee exporters in Brazil seem to have been Dutch 
and French, with some of the latter originating from Saint-Domingue, who had 
experience with slave workers. They began planting vigorously on the hills just out-
side Rio’s city limits immediately after the arrival of the royal court and the opening 
of the port to international trade in 1808. The hills were too steep for sugar cultiva-
tion and had thus remained forested; they were well suited to coffee growing, how-
ever, since the land drained well. An estimated 80 percent of all coffee exported in 
the 322-year-long colonial period was shipped between 1810 and Brazil’s independ-
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ence in 182228 – after which the pace picked up even more. Growers spread out past 
the hills surrounding Rio to the nearby mountains of the Serra do Mar, where the 
change was dramatic. An observer in the nascent district of Vassouras, which would 
become a center of cafeicultura, noted in 1835 that a few decades earlier, settlers in 
the area had lived miserably without slaves, eking out a subsistence living. He won-
dered at the fact that coffee, a product not even mentioned in Rio’s commercial cir-
cles forty years earlier, had so quickly become the province’s main export. From the 
nearby mountains, planters expanded coffee cultivation along the Paraíba Valley and 
toward the neighboring provinces of Minas Gerais and, by the 1850s, São Paulo.29 
These provinces would dominate coffee cultivation until the 1950s, when cultivators 
moved into the Southern state of Paraná. Coffee plants and workers were itinerant, 
demolishing the native forest.
Coffee as an export product not only arrived in Brazil late in its international 
history, it also initially expanded relatively slowly. As F. B. Thurber has pointed out, 
whereas Haiti reached a yearly export total of 80 million pounds after 75 years of 
cultivation, Brazil was only exporting 14 million pounds in 1830, some ninety years 
after the introduction of coffee growing. In that same year of 1820, Cuba was export-
ing some 25 million pounds.30 During its first century in Brazil, coffee was largely 
limited to home consumption, and it only overtook sugar as the chief export prod-
uct in 1832, ten years after Brazil’s independence, when production for the interna-
tional market was still low and concentrated in Rio’s hinterland.
Slavery
Although coffee was not really a colonial product in Brazil, its slavocratic produc-
tion system was a colonial heritage. Together with the contour of the land, the inher-
ited form of labor was far more important in leading to large-scale production than 
the economic or botanical exigencies of coffee growing. Brazilians did not invent 
the use of enslaved workers in coffee production. The first use of slaves to grow Cof-
fea began in 1715 in the French colony of Reunion in the Indian Ocean as well as 
in Dutch Surinam.31 French colonists in Martinique and Saint-Domingue turned to 
African imported labor at the same time as Brazilians.
In all of these cases, the purchase of humans to work in coffee fields was mod-
eled on sugar plantations, which had been using slaves for at least seven centuries 
beginning in the Mediterranean. The use of slaves was not inherent to coffee cultiva-
tion, since even in areas such as Ethiopia where slavery was widespread, slaves were 
not used for growing Arabica in appreciable numbers until the nineteenth century, 
and other coffee-growing areas like Yemen did not use enslaved workers for culti-
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vation at all. While the Dutch brought in slaves to work in export crops like sugar 
in the Dutch East Indies (today Indonesia), this was not the case for the production 
of coffee, where semi-free peasants dominated. But in the West Indies, e.g. in Suri-
nam, which featured sparser and less complex indigenous populations, Hollanders 
bought thousands of enslaved Africans.
Brazil received more bound Africans than any place outside of Africa, some 4.5 
to 5 million in total.32 They were only employed in the cultivation of coffee on a 
major scale in the nineteenth century, when Brazil’s sugar growers lost their domi-
nance to Caribbean and later to European producers. Once Brazil turned to coffee 
exports after its ports opened to the world in 1808, slave imports intensified. In fact, 
the influx of (mostly male) Africans in the period from 1820 to 1850 was the largest 
in the history of the transatlantic slave trade.
Brazil Changes the World Coffee Economy
Coffee was treated differently than sugar and rubber in the nineteenth-century Age 
of Imperialism because its low technological demands meant that Brazil could begin 
producing on an unprecedented scale. Cheap fertile virgin land and abundant and 
relatively inexpensive slave labor due to the proximity of Africa allowed Brazil and 
several other former colonies to cause world coffee prices to plummet after 1820 and 
remain low until the last quarter of the century, creating supply-induced demand.33
Brazil’s success was not simply owed to European colonial know-how or nat-
ural resource endowment. After all, as we have seen, coffee had been introduced 
into Brazil when it was a Portuguese colony early in the eighteenth century, but the 
drink enjoyed little success for the better part of a century. Instead, Brazil emerged 
as the world’s major coffee exporter partly because of its independence in 1822. Even 
more important for Brazil’s rise to dominance were exogenous changes in the world 
market: the collapse of Haitian production as a result of its revolution, the continu-
ing slave trade and later massive immigration, the growing European and later U.S. 
urban markets, and a revolution in finance and transport brought on by industrial-
ization and the spread of capitalism. Brazil’s bountiful exports financed a “hollow 
state” that guaranteed property (especially in slaves until 1888), gave a free hand to 
plantation owners, kept the roads relatively free of bandits, and maintained a frag-
ile social peace. The oligarchic coffee state was able to survive regional and interna-
tional wars.34
Even with Brazil along with Ceylon and Java greatly expanding global production 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, the essential nature of the coffee commod-
ity chain remained unchanged. All of the exported coffee was still green arabica sent 
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overseas by consignment merchants who shipped a wide array of products. They were 
represented by factors in Brazil who in turn provided planters with the working cap-
ital to bring their crops to port. Larger plantations set the standards for cultivation, 
though smaller-scale slave-worked holdings were also able to compete successfully. 
Most Brazilian fazendas were relatively large. Even fazendoles and sitios, which were 
considered small holdings, had 25 to 30 hectares, a quite substantial spread com-
pared to farms in the Caribbean, Colombia, or Central America.35 Unscheduled sail-
ing ships carried coffee packed in leather pouches or cotton and jute bags to major 
markets, where it was often sold at auction to wholesalers. Roasting, grinding and 
brewing still occurred in the home or at the coffee house. The commodity chain was 
a hybrid, partly driven by producers – since most of the improvements for expand-
ing cultivation were financed with reinvested planters’ profits – and partly driven by 
international traders who cultivated ever more foreign consumers.
The creation of the liberal export economy in the Americas, which contrasted 
with and complemented the expanding European colonialism in Africa, Asia, and 
Oceania, transformed the nature of the demand for coffee. It went from a noble bev-
erage to a bourgeois one before 1800, and eventually became a drink for the masses 
in the last part of the century. The slaves of Brazil slaked the thirst of the factory 
workers in the urbanizing industrial countries – particularly in the United States, 
the German-speaking realms, and the Netherlands.
How did this happen? Brazil’s remarkable expansion of the worldwide coffee 
economy and the increase in the commodity chain’s length and complexity resulted 
from a unique confluence of internal and external factors. Brazil’s natural internal 
endowment combined with externalities like the availability of foreign laborers in 
Africa until the Atlantic slave trade was abolished in 1850, and Southern European 
immigrants after slavery was outlawed in Brazil in 1888. Revolutionary advances in 
transportation and communication technology and vast transformations in the cof-
fee business in the United States and Western Europe were also crucial.
The unprecedented explosion of demand for coffee in the United States was not 
due to an anti-colonial distaste for the English habit of drinking tea, as has often 
been averred. After all, North American tea consumption continued to grow rap-
idly after its colonial independence. But people in the U.S. drank substantially more 
coffee because the 1831 abolition of import duties on coffee lowered prices at the 
same time at which massive immigration occurred from Northern European coun-
tries, where coffee drinking was fashionable but prices were high.36 Combined with 
its railroad boom, which created the world’s best internal transportation network by 
the mid-1800s, North America became the largest market for coffee in the world.
The explosion of coffee cultivation in the first half of the nineteenth century 
in Brazil, on the other hand, was not brought about by new production methods. 
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Renowned authority V. D. Wickizer noted (though only partially correctly) in 1951 
that “it is sometimes said that no important changes have been made in the cof-
fee production methods in the last 150 years.”37 It is certainly true that until the last 
quarter of the century, cultivation, harvesting, and processing continued to be done 
manually by the same sort of slave labor Brazilian planters had previously used for 
sugar, and French coffee planters on the African island of Réunion and on a larger 
scale in Haiti and Martinique. Indeed, it was known at the time as the “West Indian” 
cultivation method. But the vastness of some Brazilian plantations and industrial-
scale picking of coffee beans, which lowered both the cost and quality of the prod-
uct, were new. 
Still, slave labor has been given too much credit for the coffee export boom. 
Although contemporary coffee experts assumed the end of slavery would also end 
Brazil’s dominance within the global coffee economy, the abolition effected in Brazil 
in 1888 would ultimately not diminish Brazil’s position in the market. In fact, coffee 
exports expanded at an even more rapid rate in the first decade of free immigrant 
workers than they had before with the use of coerced labor.
Brazil as the Fazenda Writ Large
Brazilian production has been associated with large plantations viewed as a colo-
nial or neocolonial institution that, especially with the use of slave labor, brought 
dependence, inequality, and backwards routine production processes. Certainly, the 
fazendeiros (planters) in Brazil were convinced that successful coffee production 
required large landholdings and slaves of African origin. “O Brasil é o café e o café 
é o Negro,” said one often-quoted prominent imperial senator. History would prove 
him wrong, however: Brazilian producers were able to transition from slave labor to 
free labor while continuing to grow their estates. This seems, in retrospect, inevitable 
to most scholars of the Brazilian economy. Yet in the years before slavery was abol-
ished, many of the most learned coffee experts in Brazil argued that grande lavoura 
(large-scale agriculture) could not proceed without slaves and large amounts of cof-
fee could not be grown on small holdings. They expected emancipation to destroy 
the production system and either dramatically reduce worldwide coffee exports or 
transfer coffee’s global leadership to Java or to growers in Spanish America.
We now know in hindsight that the transition was rather smooth. When look-
ing at a graph of Brazil’s export statistics, one would not be able to recognize when 
slavery ended. Indeed, seen from our perspective of 131 years later, it seems to have 
been fairly unproblematic. Were the well-informed contemporary analysts merely 
foolish Cassandras? I will argue that the experts were in fact correct and the emanci-
24 OeZG 30 | 2019 | 3
pation of slaves did provoke a profound transformation of cafeicultura. While slave-
run fazendas in some ways ironically resembled factories in the field, the free plan-
tations after 1888 were more similar to peasant villages – and for the most part, they 
were not worked as plantations. The move away from slavery did not initially create 
more capitalist relations in agricultural labor.
The Origins of the Fazenda
Until the last decades of the twentieth century, coffee received relatively little atten-
tion in Brazilian historical studies. The general notion was that coffee meant planta-
tions and slavery. Focusing on their own history rather than comparing the devel-
opment of the Brazilian coffee complex with other American systems in which 
medium and even small plots often predominated, Brazilians concluded that coffee 
required bigness. But even Brazil’s own history belies this conclusion.
The large plantations operated in Brazil in the nineteenth century did not develop 
out of natural economies of scale. As we have seen, coffee could be cultivated per-
fectly well on small plots, and in fact it was mostly grown in gardens during its first 
century in Brazil. Although coffee was not really a colonial product, its latifundist 
and slavocratic production system were a colonial heritage. After all, the Portuguese 
had been the first Europeans to sail down Africa’s Atlantic coast to engage in the 
slave trade. They proceeded to put large numbers of slaves to work in sugar plan-
tations in Portugal, then in São Tomé, and finally in Brazil. This heritage, together 
with the contour of the land and the ease of shipping to Europe, was far more cru-
cial in leading to large-scale production than the economic or botanical exigencies 
of coffee growing. Given the sparse free population and the abundant open land that 
protected the independence of indigenous and immigrant peoples, planters looked 
abroad for workers. Even when slavery was on its deathbed, nobody thought that 
the caboclo (free) population could provide sufficient labor for a successful coffee 
economy. But Brazil had slave market mechanisms in place along with international 
credit, relative civil peace, and domestically accumulated capital. When interna-
tional coffee prices shot up in the wake of the Haitian revolution (1791–1804), large-
scale slave imports could be arranged, unlike in Spanish America. Slave ownership 
was also entrenched as a social system conferring status upon owners and as a foun-
dation of the financial system, since slaves provided the main collateral for loans.
This explains slavery, but what allowed the large scale? Slave-run coffee fincas in 
Haiti, Martinique, and Réunion had not been particularly expansive. In Haiti, coffee 
was considered a middle-class crop using poorer lands in the mountains, since the 
rich would establish large sugar plantations on the plains. In fact, a substantial num-
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ber of Haitian coffee growers were mixed-race gens de couleur.38 In Brazil, a 30-hec-
tare orchard was initially considered large – which meant that coffee could be grown 
profitably on a small scale in Brazil using slaves.
Large-scale fazendas came to predominate because of the nature of the colonial 
society, not because of demands inherent in coffee cultivation. Brazil was different 
from earlier coffee-growing lands because of its amply available, inexpensive fertile 
land and because competition from Caribbean colonial cane and later from Euro-
pean beet sugar meant that by the 1830s, coffee was far more promising in Brazil’s 
southeast for the wealthy than sugar. But planters needed either capital or credit to 
make sufficient purchases of slaves, and Brazil’s financial system was underfunded, 
rudimentary, and poorly institutionalized. Property rights were ill-defined and 
poorly policed. Combined with the clan-based and personalistic nature of Brazilian 
society, this lacking institutionalization of credit and property caused personal con-
tacts and force rather than some abstract concept of entrepreneurship to form the 
basis for acquiring the factors of production. It also dictated that in the early stages 
of development of an industry, only a limited number of people would enjoy much 
access: These were precisely the individuals who had the advantages of government 
acquiescence to their boundary lines, private force (capangas) to protect and expand 
their lands and insure that their slaves would not flee or revolt, and personal rela-
tionships with the merchants in the ports and bankers who extended credit. These 
advantages grew as the planter’s holdings and reputation grew39 – and success was 
thus a self-fulfilling prophecy, at least for a few generations.
Although planters introduced few technical or agronomic innovations besides 
hulling machines in the early boom years before 1860, their ability to move into 
adjoining “virgin lands” (meaning areas no resident had title or the physical abil-
ity to hold on to) with their much greater natural productivity vastly increased their 
chances of success. Once the railroads snaked their way into the interior in the 1860s 
and 1870s, plantations enjoyed the added advantage of lower transport costs. In the 
nineteenth century, the only other producer with a rail system for delivering cof-
fee to port was comparatively small Costa Rica. Important planters were often large 
stockholders in Brazil’s coffee railroads and enjoyed the political influence to ensure 
that their railway received government monopoly concessions. They were thus able 
to ensure that a line passed through or near their properties as well as inhibiting 
access to the rail system for competitors. This allowed the fazendeiros to build pri-
vate lines to bring their crop to the train station. Since the cost of transport to Rio 
or Santos – even using the railroads – often exceeded the cost of harvesting, econo-
mies here could greatly increase profits.40 Summarily, the Brazilian coffee latifundia 
resulted much more from political influence, family prestige, and the use of coer-
cion – that is, from primitive accumulation – than from capitalist entrepreneurship, 
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and their profits should therefore be construed more as monopoly rents than as sur-
plus value.
The Prussian agronomist Franz Dafert, who as the first head of the Campinas 
agricultural station in São Paulo probably knew fazendeiro practices as well as any-
one, came to the deprecatory conclusion regarding São Paulo that “nature does eve-
rything she can for coffee – and man does as little as possible.” 41 He called Brazilian 
coffee cultivation “Raubbau” (overexploitation). Given the eighty-hour weeks forced 
upon coffee slaves at harvest time, Dafert was clearly referring to the lack of planter 
innovation, not the indolence of workers.
Was the slave plantation a “factory in the field”? Sidney Mintz argues that slave-
based sugar plantations, which preceded textile factories by more than a century, 
were the first truly industrial establishments in the world. Their large, specialized, 
integrated, and disciplined labor force was combined with technologically sophisti-
cated and capital-intensive refining mills. In other words, they were factories even 
though they used slave labor – in fact, it was precisely because of their unfree sta-
tus that the workers were disciplined, regimented, and centrally controlled.42 Robin 
Blackburn takes this counter-intuitive notion even further by arguing convincingly 
not only that “the enterprises that battened on slave labor and produce embodied 
[…] apparently advanced forms of technical and economic modernization” but also 
that slavery’s “development was associated with several of those processes which 
have been held to define modernity.”43
The same concept has been applied to Brazilian coffee planters. The fathers of 
grande lavoura are sometimes seen as similar rural agro-industrialists, although 
more often they have been likened to feudal lords who oversaw the production by 
their bound serfs. At different times, both views made sense. Until the end of slavery 
neared in the late 1870s, production was labor-intensive with little use of machines. 
Planters financed expansion out of their own profits to a considerable extent, and 
slaves were by far their largest expense. Unlike in the United States, the enslaved 
population could not biologically reproduce fast enough to maintain itself, much 
less expand its numbers.44
Coffee production on the fazenda, unlike sugar plantation cultivation, still 
occurred largely in peasant fashion. Clearing the soil, preparing the ground, plant-
ing and raising seedlings, pruning, weeding, and even harvesting were all done by 
hand by individuals or small groups. Because of the enormity of the virgin and fer-
tile frontier, land was cheap and readily accessible. As distinguished Brazilian his-
torian Sergio Buarque de Holanda put it: “Era uma lavoura não somente extensiva 
como dissipadora – antes mineração do que agricultura.”45 The planters acted more 
as land speculators and merchants than as farmers or agro-industrialists, with their 
major capital investments being housing, drying grounds and, most of all, hulling 
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and washing machinery. But even the latter were relatively small expenditures in 
Brazil. Warren Dean noted that the productive system for coffee in the São Paulo 
region “lacked the capacity to experiment and incorporate new techniques. The 
miraculous expansion of Paulista coffee seems to have depended almost entirely on 
natural comparative advantage and very little on the skill of planters.”46
Quantity and productivity of coffee processing were valued over quality. Brazil-
ians used the “dry” method of treating the cherries, which required far less machin-
ery than the “wet” method. The dry method allowed all cherries on a branch to 
be harvested and processed at the same time, regardless of their different stages of 
ripeness. This was a labor-intensive solution that reduced the machinery and labor 
costs of the harvest and processing.47 It also lowered the quality of the finished prod-
uct, but thereby stimulated the growth of popular demand abroad by creating abun-
dant quantities of relatively cheap coffee. There were some economies of scale if the 
planter built a sophisticated hulling plant, but this apparently did not much improve 
the coffee’s quality. The imperative of a large supply of raw material to feed the vora-
cious machines, as Morena Fraginals explains was the case with the sugar central, 
certainly did not exist on the coffee fazendas.48 Until the railroad reached into the 
Paraíba Valley in the 1860s, and eventually to other regions decades later, transpor-
tation occurred by mule, again lessening the economic advantages of large estates. 
In fact, the terrain and lack of economies of scale meant that fazendas in the Paraíba 
Valley were not particularly large compared to sugar plantations.
Big farmers generally owned numerous relatively self-sufficient parcels of land 
rather than a centralized plantation. Brazil’s largest coffee planter, the Viscount of 
Novo Friburgo, owned nine different fazendas. The average fazenda spanned 800 
to 1,100 hectares, but over two-thirds of this area was not planted with coffee, with 
much of it remaining virgin forest. This was, of course, still very large by coffee 
standards – but not by sugar standards. Even the largest fazenda had fewer than 200 
slaves working its fields.
Until the last decade and a half of slavery, fazendas were quite self-sufficient, cre-
ating what has been termed a “peasant breach” or “proto-peasantry”. Slaves often 
had free time and their own plots to grow provisions for themselves. They were even 
often allowed to sell their surplus. Aside from the harvest, much of the work was 
done in small groups.49 C. F. van Delden Laërne from the Netherlands observed that 
“a plantation slave in central Brazil […] has actually the sole charge of a plantation 
covering in the Rio zone 3 hectares and in the Santos zone 2 and three-quarters.”50
Although Laërne also stated that there were no peasants outside the fazenda, in 
fact there was also a smallholding group even under grande lavoura.51 In the coffee 
growing municipio of Rio Bonito in Rio de Janeiro state, for instance, holdings of 
under 400 hectares represented 98 percent of all holdings and 79 percent of the land 
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in 1854–55.52 Small holdings in neighboring municipios constituted 46 to 65 per-
cent of the respective totals. 53 In the province of Minas Gerais, smaller coffee hold-
ings were also the rule. These numbers overstate the concentration of land, however, 
because much of the terrain was left for future use and planters often rented out, for 
money or for shares, parts of their estates for use by landless freemen. These individ-
uals frequently grew their own subsistence crops as well as coffee.54
A Revolution in the Fields
 A fact that has been little recognized by historians of slavery so far is that the nature 
of the slave coffee economy was transformed markedly during its last two decades, 
when it did begin to resemble factories in the field. The end of the Atlantic slave 
trade in 1850, the 1871 Law of the Free Womb, and the 1885 Sexagenarian Law ulti-
mately contributed to the demise of slavery – but in the short run, they raised the 
price of slaves and drove planters to mechanization to save on costly slave labor. As 
Laërne reported, “At the present time, fortunes are being spent for drying fields, 
water-pipes, and machinery.”55 Mechanical modernization was a means of contin-
uing slavery rather than replacing it, but its implications were significant. Planters 
who had previously self-financed now had to take out substantial loans. The plant-
ers’ comissarios (factors) went from being the agents of agriculturalists to becoming 
their bankers.56
To repay them, fazendeiros intensified their labor demands on coffee production 
rather than continuing the previous more diversified subsistence production. Wage 
labor was increasingly used for peripheral tasks. Specialization emerged in the coun-
tryside as subsistence farmers sold to the planters, who now had to purchase staples 
with money.57 Endowment with land as a means of attracting free laborers or induc-
ing them to work part-time on the fazenda became more common as well. While 
slave labor had previously been the main ingredient for success, land titles and win-
ning disputes now became more important.58 The final years of slavery saw a move-
ment towards capitalism as loans, monetary payments, and mechanization became 
widespread and agricultural specialization, exploitation, and the employment of free 
labor in subsidiary tasks intensified. Slaves were treated as industrial machinery as 
their labor power was concentrated on coffee.
But the fazendeiros were in a bind. Heavily indebted to their comissarios or to 
the Banco do Brasil, they could not easily afford the increased monetary demands 
of the new capitalistic practices. Their main problem was the falta de brazos (lack of 
manpower). When Laërne told planters about technical agricultural systems in Java, 
“they listened with obvious indifference” – but when he discussed the plentiful free 
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but coerced labor on the Southeast Asian island, “very often the fazendeiros were 
in raptures and could hardly restrain an impulse of natural jealousy.”59 They contin-
ued to believe that coffee cultivation demanded large undertakings and feared that 
grande lavoura could not proceed without slaves.
This fear echoed through the halls of the 1878 Congresso Agricola, the only 
occasion on which that planters voiced their fears jointly and directly. Expert for-
eign students of the Brazilian cafeicultura such as the Frenchman Louis Couty or the 
Dutchman Laërne were convinced that the end of slavery would necessitate a rev-
olution in rural land tenure. Believing the native population to be too “indolent” 
and intractable to work the cafezais, they felt that only Chinese coolies or European 
immigrants could save coffee. The former were dismissed by Brazilian planters as a 
“vice-ridden” race owing to the mistaken belief that they were all addicted to opium. 
This left the Europeans who, it was believed, would only work on small plots on 
their own accounts, thus ending grande lavoura. Earlier efforts to bring in European 
immigrants and regiment them for large-scale agriculture had failed, even leading 
to revolt.60 Yet we know that after its emancipation, Brazil continued to have some 
latifundia while attracting millions of immigrants to the fields. Does this imply that 
the foreign experts were wrong about abolition undercutting large landholdings? I 
will argue that they were in fact correct. Although land ownership continued to be 
concentrated in the most prosperous coffee areas, the coffee fields were no longer 
worked as large enterprises. Instead, the immigrant-worked fazenda more resem-
bled a peasant village than a modern factory in the field.
Brazilian Coffee after Slavery
The abolition of slavery in 1888 brought about one of the most abrupt and thor-
ough transformations of a labor system in history – particularly in the state of São 
Paulo, which by this time was the world’s foremost coffee producer. Rather than 
employing the local freedmen and attracting other free Brazilians as was done in 
other post-slavery societies, Paulistas instead recruited almost a million Italian, Por-
tuguese, and Spanish immigrants to their fazendas by 1914.61 This was the only time 
in history when massive numbers of Europeans crossed the Atlantic to work on 
semi-tropical plantations. The transformation was so rapid that the end of slavery 
ultimately did not harm the coffee economy at all – a strikingly different result from 
that of Haiti’s forced abolition, which dramatically reduced Haitian coffee exports 
for decades.62 Brazilian coffee exports, on the other hand, grew fivefold in the two 
decades after the so-called Golden Law of Abolition was passed. It turned out that 
coffee did not need slaves after all.
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Having become a mass consumption good in the nineteenth century once peo-
ple in the United States began drinking almost half the crop, coffee required cheap 
labor to continue to expand its markets. International conditions meant that Euro-
pean immigrants could provide low-cost workers at this particular moment in his-
tory. In the late 1880s, several Mediterranean economies were suffering land crises 
that encouraged many of their citizens to look across the Atlantic. At the same time, 
the United States and Argentina were mired in recession, and coffee prices in Brazil 
were nearing all-time highs. With ample fertile land, the end of labor competition 
by slaves, and government-subsidized ship passage, Brazil was able to enlist many 
European fortune-seekers to expand the coffee frontier.
But the decision to rely on immigrants also derived from internal struggles 
within Brazil. Resistance by Brazilian freedmen, who refused to work the long hours 
customary under slavery conditions voluntarily and refused to allow their wives and 
children into the fields, as well as by other peasants who preferred to cultivate their 
own plots rather than working for fazendeiros, necessitated the more costly immi-
gration solution. The planters’ racism, which convinced them that former slaves 
would work well only under the threat of the lash but not voluntarily according to 
the incentives of the market, also contributed to the transition to European field 
hands.63
The heroic version of the Paulista success story goes something like this: In the 
western part of the state of São Paulo, slavery was not yet entrenched. When emanci-
pation became inevitable, planters turned to immigrant labor. The coffee fazendeiro 
became an agro-industrialist on a scale previously unknown in coffee cultivation, 
with the Paulistas establishing some of the largest plantations ever built anywhere. 
The Cambuhy estate covered 250,000 acres, on which it grew almost three million 
trees (reaching six million in the 1940s), tied together by sixty kilometers of pri-
vate railroad track and three hundred kilometers of roads.64 Many other plantations 
spread across tens of thousands of acres. The planter invested some of his agricul-
tural capital not only into urban real estate, public works, and government bonds, 
but also into railroads, banks, and even factories. Moreover, unlike their Paraíba 
Valley counterparts, Paulista agriculturalists were not dependent on urban coffee 
factors and their parasitic merchant mentality. Many Paulistas liked to believe that 
the fazendeiro had been transformed from rentier to capitalist, from coffee baron to 
entrepreneur. Prominent coffee families such as the Prados diversified into industry, 
banking, and transportation once their capital was no longer tied up in slaves. They 
became the leading partners in what is generally acknowledged as the most progres-
sive national bourgeoisie in Latin America, and indeed one of the most entrepre-
neurial in the entire Third World. They industrialized São Paulo.65
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Despite this rousing story, evidence shows that most post-abolition fazendei-
ros were actually not heroic capitalists. Indeed, since they no longer needed to use 
money or credit to purchase labor in advance as they had often been forced to under 
slavery, and because most were indebted from their late flurry of slave purchases, 
planters may have become less dependent on capital in agriculture for some years 
after 1888. Financially strapped after emancipation and a dramatic decline in cof-
fee prices in 1896, most planters invested little in tools, machinery, warehouses, or 
irrigation. An informed estimate in 1897 attributed 80 percent of the cost of estab-
lishing a plantation to purchasing the land and replacing the native forests with 
coffee orchards. Payments in money were minimized. Fazendeiros were still loath 
to study agronomy, sending their children off to become lawyers and politicians 
instead. They attacked the land with predatory savageness, eschewing contour plow-
ing, shade trees, and fertilizers.66 Franz Dafert, the Prussian agronomist hired by São 
Paulo’s state government to increase productivity, complained that the “indolent” 
growers “accustomed to the easy and unworried life of the rich domain of torrid 
lands have not the least idea of the hard work of the great European crops.”67
Planters were effectively alchemists in reverse, turning fertile forests into deserts 
within three or four decades. Indeed, Brazilian fazendeiros were more akin to min-
ers rapaciously hauling wealth out of the soil than to agronomists with reverence 
for the land. They left in their wake denuded hills and a “hollow frontier.” These 
were not men of the likes of fictitious advertising character Juan Valdez, working the 
same land in Colombia and in Central America generation after generation, care-
fully maintaining its fertility. Nor did Brazilian planters act in a particularly bour-
geois fashion: Their robber mentality led them to fight against the surveying of land, 
the setting of boundaries, and the registration of titles, and they also opposed mort-
gage registries and legal foreclosures. In short, the fazendeiros inhibited both land 
and financial markets, aiming to invest as little as necessary, pay as few taxes as 
possible, and move on. They acted more as land speculators and merchants than 
as farmers or agro-industrialists, with their commercial advantage stemming from 
access to capital and the ability to coerce cheap labor rather than from mastery of 
technology and agronomy or from ownership of land.
The Cambuhy estate, which later under British ownership would become the 
largest coffee fazenda in the world, exemplifies the trajectory of cafeicultura in the 
aftermath of abolition. An enormous plot granted originally as a colonial sesmaria, 
it had been barely used under slavery. When coffee cultivation commenced in the 
1890s, the estate was fragmented by multiple renters on the land. As George Little, 
who studied the estate, observed: “Small plantations grew, flourished and were aban-
doned here and there over the estate. There was no over-all policy except that of get-
ting profits where possible.”68 By 1911, there were seven different fazendas on the 
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estate and numerous different labor relations. One hundred and forty-seven families 
lived on the land as colonos (explained below), 89 were sharecroppers, and 40 lived 
for free as agregados. In addition to coffee, they grew 5,000 sacks of beans and 22,000 
sacks of corn per year, and raised 4,500 pigs.
The Colono Labor System
The extent to which Paulista fazendeiros were capitalists, even after the end of slav-
ery, is disputable. The colono system that replaced slavery in São Paulo with Euro-
pean immigrants was a heterogeneous form that included aspects of peasant pro-
duction and of wage labor. The central work unit was the family, with planters reluc-
tant to take on single immigrants. Social reproduction costs were borne by the 
individual household, which grew and cooked food, made clothes, and raised the 
children. Under slavery, the responsibility for supplying basic provisions had gen-
erally fallen on the master. Now, only the head of the colono household received 
money payments although the entire family worked. For most of the year, he was 
occupied with caring for around 2,000 to 2,500 trees; a family might tend 5,000 
trees (about fifteen acres).69 There was little specialization or integration. Tending 
the planter’s trees provided the colono with about 40 percent of his monetary income 
(which was often paid in scrip only redeemable at the overpriced fazenda store.) 
During harvest season and occasionally at other times, he was paid for day work, 
which contributed around one-fourth of his monetary earnings. But most of this 
total income was earned as a peasant, not as a coffee worker. By the 1890s, colonos 
received free housing, subsistence lots, and pasturage privileges. According to an 
estimate by Holloway, subsistence may have constituted roughly 70 percent of the 
colono’s total income. In addition, he usually sold some of his own corn, beans, and 
livestock, which yielded one-third to forty percent of his earnings.70 Taken together, 
this means that about 80 percent of a colono’s total income did not come from his 
work in the coffee groves.71 Indeed, coffee was an evil put up with in order to gain 
access to cornfields. For the colono, says Holloway, “coffee was dependence, subser-
vience, the source of justified but disagreeable conflicts, mistrust and disciplinary 
measures; corn was freedom of action and economic autonomy.”72 This is how Bra-
zilian planters obtained sufficient labor to grow coffee, even while paying very little 
for coffee work: Paulista fazenda production more closely resembled a collection of 
peasants than a factory in the fields.
Pay was low. According to one estimate, a worker could harvest 100 pounds of 
coffee cherries a day, which yielded 20 pounds of coffee beans. Since the average 
Santos FOB price during the 1900–1930 period was 7 or 8 cents a pound, and har-
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vest costs were calculated at 15 to 18 percent of the cost of delivering beans to San-
tos, their coffee work likely earned workers in the vicinity of 1 cent per pound, or 20 
cents a day.73 Verena Stolcke has estimated that no more than 8 percent of the first 
generation of colonos to arrive in the cafezais were able to save enough money to 
buy their own land by 1910. Holloway, Dean, and Mauricio Font are more sanguine 
concerning immigrant opportunities, which probably did improve appreciably after 
World War I when coffee prices increased and urban opportunities improved.74
By hiring families, planters reduced their direct control over individual workers, 
relying instead on the patriarchal power of the heads of households. This won the 
allegiance of the relatively empowered men of the house and lowered planter costs 
for overseeing workers. In return, the fazendeiro obtained a flexible labor force that 
could be tapped during the harvest season when more hands were needed.75 Where 
coffee cultivation under slavery had broken up families and depended primarily on 
male workers (far more men than women were imported from Africa), the family 
was the backbone of the colono system.
By deciding to appeal to European immigrants, who after all had a choice whether 
or not to come to Brazil, planters had to make work conditions sufficiently attrac-
tive. Consequently, unlike in many other coffee economies, extra-economic state 
coercion was limited. Earlier experiments during the era of slavery had failed due to 
excessive planter repression.76 Indeed, the Italian government had forbidden immi-
gration at the time because of the bad treatment meted out to immigrants. Planters 
seemed to have learned their lesson, however. The state did not play a large role in 
keeping colonos on the fazenda, nor was debt peonage generally applied. There was 
an active labor market. Verena Stolcke notes the contradictory nature of the sys-
tem: While it is true that fazendeiros used coercion and violence to keep workers on 
the plantations and extract profit, they largely came to treat the problem of reduc-
ing labor costs by increasing the supply of workers. Extra-economic coercion, which 
was sometimes considerable, served essentially to improve the bargaining position 
of fazendeiros in the labor market.77
Colonos could and did move about, which drove the expansive growth of the 
coffee frontier. A French visitor, Pierre Denis, complained that “not being property 
owners, Italian colonos are imperfectly tied to the soil […] they only work when they 
are offered attractive conditions. Colonos are passionate about their independence 
and refuse all contracts of over one year.”78 It has been estimated that 40 to 60 per-
cent of all colonos switched plantations every year, seeking better lands for their sub-
sistence crops as well as better treatment. Workers also frequently used the weapon 
of the strike: Between 1913 and 1930, there were more than one hundred strikes – 
albeit usually of limited scope – in São Paulo’s coffee groves alone.79 And of course 
they had the ultimate choice of leaving Brazil altogether. Between 1902 and 1913, 65 
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percent of Italian immigrants did so – though this reflected not only their relative 
freedom of movement but also the low cost of ship fares to Italy: The contemporary 
Brazilian and Argentinean export booms stimulated vast fleets of low-cost ships – so 
low that Argentina’s golondrinos could afford to commute yearly from Italy to Argen-
tina’s wheat fields. Reports of harsh treatment in the coffee fields also slowed down 
Italian immigration to Brazil. In response, the government of São Paulo created the 
Patronato Agícola in 1911 to “defend the rights and interests of agricultural work-
ers.”80 This government protection would prove paltry, but it did demonstrate some 
concern with rural workers.
Rather than state aid, it was the colonos’ relative freedom of movement, their 
ability to organize strikes, and their work/land options that made many of them bet-
ter off than smallholders in Spanish America, where property rights often forced 
peasants to eke out an existence on marginal lands. When viewed from the perspec-
tive of the smallholder or colono, the colono system and the Colombian or Central 
American smallholding system actually exhibited remarkable similarities. In both 
Brazil and Colombia, the family was the main unit of labor and only the head of the 
household was usually paid, receiving most of his remuneration in usufruct. The 
Brazilian colono received housing as well as use of land for growing his own fam-
ily’s food and sometimes for raising livestock. He sold surplus food and occasion-
ally coffee to the market. For most of the year, he tended the planter’s coffee trees, 
but he was also paid for day work, especially during harvest season. The Colombian 
campesino likewise grew his own food and worked his own plot with his family. He 
and his family members often found employment as day laborers for larger hold-
ings to supplement their income.81 The planter in Brazil and the large merchant in 
Colombia fulfilled the same role: They lent or sold land to the colonos or campesinos, 
they provided credit, they processed and sold the harvested coffee, they employed 
the peasant families as day laborers, they invested in transportation, and they were 
influential in the local government.82
Over time, the similarity between the two systems grew as colonos in Brazil actu-
ally became smallholders, buying land to increase their independence. By 1930, 
landownership had become less concentrated as immigrant urban dwellers and field 
workers purchased plots. Slavery was long gone, but even sharecropping declined; it 
was replaced by wage labor and family production. As aged coffee trees lost produc-
tivity, planters sold them off to smallholders. This trend became particularly notice-
able after World War I, when the booming economy offered fazendeiros many lucra-
tive alternatives to landholding. It occurred in the dynamic zones of São Paulo as 
well as in the less promising coffee states. Indeed, Mussolini instructed the Italian 
government to buy up the Cambuhy estate and divide it among Italian colonos. The 
plan failed because the asking price was too high, but many neighboring fazendas 
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were in fact divided up into smallholdings after World War I.83 By 1934, foreigners – 
primarily immigrants – owned almost half of the rural holdings in São Paulo.84 By 
1927, 74 percent of holdings were smaller than 62 acres and 94 percent were smaller 
than 312 acres (although the largest 6 percent produced almost half of all the coffee, 
indicating that they had kept the best land for themselves).85
In other coffee states, the scale of production had always been smaller. Broken 
terrain had prevented Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro from establishing large cafez-
ais in the nineteenth century, while lack of capital had inhibited Espírito Santo. Par-
aná, which only began producing on a large scale after 1930, was divided into small 
holdings by land companies. These states also did not attract much European immi-
gration, instead tapping the labor of the native population through sharecropping, 
renting, and casual labor arrangements usually applied on relatively small plots by 
Brazilian standards. Some of the laborers were “nomadic” in Nancy Naro’s words, 
and in some areas such as Capivary, Rio de Janeiro, there was a caipirização of for-
mer tenants of large estates.86 Though their productivity was nowhere near as high 
as São Paulo’s, these states were nevertheless able competitors in the world market.
There is a tendency to think of Brazil as São Paulo writ large. But the other cof-
fee states continued to be important even after São Paulo rose to prominence in 
the 1890s. If Brazil had split into twenty independent countries in 1906, São Paulo 
would have continued to be the world’s greatest coffee exporter – but Minas Ger-
ais would have been second, Rio de Janeiro third, and even Espírito Santo exported 
almost as much as fourth-place Colombia.
Brazilian growers not only dominated the international coffee market by pro-
ducing most of the world’s coffee until World War II, but they also institutionalized 
government coffee price supports beginning in 1906 and created state financing, 
warehousing, and transport institutions. Other Latin American coffee exporters fol-
lowed Brazil’s lead in the twentieth century, extending coffee frontiers and enlarg-
ing the role of state institutions. The world coffee market grew eightfold in the hun-
dred years after 1856, with Brazilian exports dominating and other Latin Ameri-
can cultivators rapidly increasing their output by the early twentieth century.87 This 
eventually led to the founding of the International Coffee Organization in 1961 as 
the frontiers of coffee extended almost around the whole world for producers and/
or consumers.
Postscript
Brazil continued to dominate the world coffee economy in the years after 1930, 
but this apparent continuity masks a marked transformation. After having moved 
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southward from the Paraíba Valley to western São Paulo, coffee trees arrived in the 
southern state of Paraná. Paraná’s “black frost” of 1975 proved that the crop had 
reached the southern limits of its range, and farmers thus returned north to the trop-
ics. However, they were now able to plant in regions previously not usable for cof-
fee, in part thanks to the advances in agronomy being taught by new agricultural 
universities. Today, coffee flourishes in the Cerrado area of Minas Gerais as well as 
in western Bahia, in Espírito Santo, and in the Amazonian state of Rondônia. Brazil 
remains the world’s leading coffee producer and exporter by a large margin, having 
exported 37 percent of the global volume in 2017/18 – almost twice as much as the 
second largest exporter.88
But coffee is no longer as important for Brazil as it was in the nineteenth and the 
first half of the twentieth century. Its share in the national economy has shrunk dra-
matically. Today, coffee contributes only two percent of the country’s exports and 
0.3 percent of its GDP, and it employs 0.6 percent of the workforce. It is also not a 
major source of federal revenue. Thanks to the development of new high-yield cul-
tivars like Catuaí and Novo Mundo, Brazilian production has become much more 
intensive; output has grown 50 percent since 1990, while land usage has actually 
declined.89 Coffee cultivation has created an intensive internal frontier, but cafei-
cultura no longer depends on forest rent or spreading out into virgin areas. Agron-
omists have discovered how to grow it in Minas Gerais’ Cerrado savanna area and 
in western Bahia, a region that previously sustained little agriculture. Coffee is no 
longer the dominant crop there either, however: Soy grown on vast mechanized 
holdings overshadows Coffea in these reclaimed lands.
Even as Brazil’s population has tripled since 1960, it has become a developed 
country with the ninth largest economy in the world (even after years of terrible 
recession), and 85 percent of the population now live in cities. As a result, Brazilians 
are currently the world’s second largest consumers of coffee, and they no longer only 
grow Arabica cultivars. With rising domestic demand for instant coffee – first made 
commercially popular in the 1940s by an agreement between the Brazilian govern-
ment and the Swiss Nestlé company – Brazil has become one of the world’s foremost 
Robusta cultivators and largest producers of instant coffee, almost all of which is 
for domestic use. Cultivation has changed markedly, adopting the techniques of the 
green revolution like chemical fertilizers and pesticides, irrigation, a dense network 
of paved roads, and advanced telecommunications. Present-day agricultural work-
ers are native, mobile and relatively well paid. 
The Brazilian case is fundamental to understanding the trajectory of the com-
moditization and expansion of coffee, still one of the world’s most valuable inter-
nationally traded agricultural products. But Brazil’s agricultural expansion is also 
exceptional: The vast natural resources, rapid population and urban growth, and 
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intensification of capitalist relations of production seen there occurred nowhere else 
in the coffee growing world. Nor have other coffee cultivators become as enthusi-
astic coffee consumers as the Brazilians. Globalization is a complicated, dynamic, 
inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory process. Nature and humans, technology 
and natural responses like droughts, floods, pests, disease, and mutations are locked 
in an unpredictable struggle to control the commodities’ botanical and social lives.
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